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Adolescence is a period of increased sensitivity to social contexts. To evaluate how social
context sensitivity changes over development—and influences reward learning—we
investigated how children and adolescents perceive and integrate rewards for oneself
and others during a dynamic risky decision-making task. Children and adolescents
(N = 75, 8–16 years) performed the Social Gambling Task (SGT, Kwak et al., 2014)
and completed a set of questionnaires measuring other-regarding behavior. In the SGT,
participants choose amongst four card decks that have different payout structures for
oneself and for a charity. We examined patterns of choices, overall decision strategies,
and how reward outcomes led to trial-by-trial adjustments in behavior, as estimated
using a reinforcement-learning model. Performance of children and adolescents was
compared to data from a previously collected sample of adults (N = 102) performing
the identical task. We found that that children/adolescents were not only more sensitive
to rewards directed to the charity than self but also showed greater prosocial tendencies
on independent measures of other-regarding behavior. Children and adolescents also
showed less use of a strategy that prioritizes rewards for self at the expense of rewards
for others. These results support the conclusion that, compared to adults, children and
adolescents show greater sensitivity to outcomes for others when making decisions and
learning about potential rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
Adolescence is commonly characterized as a period of poor decision making manifested in risky,
irrational, and often self-destructive choices (Blakemore and Robbins, 2012). Yet, adolescence is
also a period of heightened sensitivity to social contexts (Nelson et al., 2005; Blakemore, 2010;
Burnett et al., 2011; Crone and Dahl, 2012), consistent with the importance of acquiring skills
necessary for independent contributions to society. To achieve this end, adolescents are motivated
to build social networks amongst their peers and to take actions that strengthen those social
networks (Crone and Dahl, 2012). With the increase in motivation for social belonging, social
cognitive skills also peak in adolescence as reported by studies of mentalizing, meta-cognition,
perspective taking, and social reasoning (Blakemore, 2008; Burnett et al., 2011). The development
of these essential social cognitive skills allows adolescents to move beyond self-oriented thoughts
and behaviors and to start engaging in socially-oriented behaviors (Eiesnberg and Fabes, 1998).
Adolescents’ increase in sensitivity to social values has been repeatedly shown by social decision
making studies using one-shot interactive games such as the ultimatum game, dictator game, and
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trust game (Harbaugh and Krause, 2000; Sutter, 2007; Gürog˘lu
et al., 2009; Almås et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2010, 2011,
2014; Overgaauw et al., 2012; Steinbeis et al., 2012; Fett et al.,
2014; Gürog˘lu et al., 2014; Steinmann et al., 2014). These studies
show that the basic mechanisms underlying one’s prosocial
tendencies such as considerations for fairness, altruism, trust,
and reciprocity continue to develop from childhood through
adolescence (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Crone and Dahl, 2012). During
this period, the other-oriented prosocial tendencies can become
more dominant than self-oriented thoughts (Crone and Dahl,
2012). There have also been studies looking at the developmental
trajectory of prosocial behaviors across adolescence using self-
report measures (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2002, 2005; Eiesnberg
and Fabes, 1998; Killen and Turiel, 1998; Carlo et al., 1999,
2007; Fabes et al., 1999; Wentzel et al., 2007; Luengo Kanacri
et al., 2013). These studies show mixed findings of consistent
increase in prosocial tendencies or a quadratic change across age
showing decrease in prosociality until mid-adolescence and then
an increase toward late adolescence. Increased sensitivity to social
contexts is in line with the developmental changes in sensitivity to
“hot” (high affective arousal state) contexts, which peaks around
adolescence (Boyer and Byrnes, 2009).
While results from one-shot interactive games and from self-
reports have provided important insights about the development
of social preferences, both sorts of measures have inherent
limitations. Both involve explicit, direct probes of prosociality,
which may increase their susceptibility to experimenter bias
particularly in younger samples (Bryan and London, 1970;
Zarbatany et al., 1985; Innocenti and Pazienza, 2006). One-
shot interactive games also provide only very limited data—
often a single choice per participant—which precludes analysis
of learning effects. Everyday social decisions, in contrast, are
oftenmade in a dynamic environment that requires adjusting our
behavior based on the past experience (e.g., learning from past
rewards; Erdem and Keane, 1996).
In a recent study, we developed a Social Gambling Task
(SGT) that measures how learning of rewards unfolds under
a social environment (Kwak et al., 2014). Specifically, the task
incorporates non-social and social rewards into an interactive
and dynamic card game. Based upon the well-studied Iowa
Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994), the SGT contains four
decks that each have a different relative distribution of payoffs
for oneself and for a desirable charity. We used charitable
donations as a prototypic method for eliciting social preferences
as they reliably engage processes associated with social cognition
(Tankersley et al., 2007; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011) and with
reward evaluation (Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007). We
also employed a reinforcement-learning model to understand
the course of reward learning throughout the task. Converging
evidence from choices and modeling results showed that people
readily learn about others’ reward contingencies, just as they do
for their own rewards, although there were significant individual
differences in self vs. charity reward learning reflecting variability
in the expressions of prosocial behaviors like altruism, fairness,
and trust (Fehr and Schmidt, 2003; Kishida et al., 2010; Murphy
et al., 2011). More specifically, greater relative valuation for
social rewards compared to self rewards as indexed by a reward
weighting parameter of the model was associated with individual
differences in self-reported prosocial tendencies (Kwak et al.,
2014). Thus, the SGT provides a well-defined laboratory index of
prosociality that not only shares features of more natural decision
tasks (e.g., implicit learning, dynamic information acquisition)
but also relates to independent measures of other-regarding
behavior.
In the current study, we investigated how children in the
age of pre-adolescence and adolescence (8–16 years) perceive
and integrate rewards of both self and others in the SGT. To
assess how reward outcomes influenced choice behavior, we
applied a reinforcement learning model and compared both
choices and model estimates between children/adolescents and
adults. Our previous study demonstrated that the SGT gives
a measure of how an individual balances rewards of oneself
versus others. Based on the current literature on the development
of social values, we hypothesized that children and adolescents
(compared to adults) will exhibit increased sensitivity toward
rewards directed to others.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 75 pre-adolescent children and adolescents (32 males
and 43 females, age range = 8–16 years, M = 12 years, SD =
3 years) participated in this study. Performance was compared
to data from young adults in a previously collected and reported
study (N = 102; 44 men, 58 women; age range = 18–36 years,
M = 23 years, SD = 4 years) (Kwak et al., 2014). Children and
adolescents were recruited from local private schools in greater
Durham, NC; these schools’ demographics (e.g., socioeconomic
status) are largely similar to that of the young adult population
from which our prior adult sample was drawn. Children and
adolescents were tested in our behavioral testing laboratory on
the Duke campus; this testing environment was identical to that
previously used for the adult participants. To examine the effect
of age, we additionally performed correlational analyses using age
as a covariate within our child/adolescent age group. All children
and adolescents provided parent consent and child assent under
a protocol approved by the Duke University Institutional Review
Board.
Procedure
At the outset of the experiment, participants viewed instructions
on the study paradigm. Then, they read a brief introduction to
a charity foundation to which earnings would be donated. As
a charity with broad appeal to the age range studied, we used
the “Make a Wish!” foundation, which helps young children
with severe illness accomplish their dreams. The introduction
to the foundation included example stories of children whose
wishes come true (e.g., becoming a firefighter) with the help of
the foundation. Participants then performed the Social Gambling
Task (SGT) described below. After completion of the task,
participants filled out the Helping Orientation Questionnaire
(HOQ), an index of prosocial personality (Romer et al., 1986) as
well as several questions regarding the charity foundation. Details
about the questionnaires are in the Supplementary Materials. At
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the end of each experimental session, the experimenter paid the
participant and made a donation to the charity (both ranging
from $10 to $16) according to their choices. The participants
were explicitly told that the amount of money they won for the
charity in this task (ranging from $10 to $16) will be donated to
the foundation.
Social Gambling Task (SGT)
SGTmodifies the basic structure of the Iowa gambling task (IGT;
Bechara et al., 1994), such that each card deck is associated not
only with monetary outcomes for the player, but also monetary
outcomes for the charity. The four decks had differing payoffs for
self versus charity in a 2 × 2 fully orthogonal design (S+/C+,
S+/C−, S−/C+, S−/C−; S = self, C = charity, + = gain deck,
−= loss deck); see Figure 1 for details on card payout structure.
For the display of outcomes of gain decks (Decks S+/C+ and
S+/C−, for self; Decks S+/C+ and S−/C+ for charity), each
card draw gave $50 (for either self or charity), but in some trials
it was also associated with losses ranging between $25 and $75
(i.e., loss of either $25, $50, or $75). Each card draw displayed
one outcome value (i.e., either −$25, $0, $25, or $50), which was
the net outcome combining the gain and loss. Every 10 trials
had 5 loss trials with a total loss of $250, thus resulting in an
accumulated net gain of $250. For the display of outcomes of loss
decks (Decks S−/C+ and S−/C−, for self; Decks S+/C− and
S−/C−, for charity), each card draw gave $100 (for either self
or charity) with some trials giving losses ranging between $150
and $350 (i.e., loss of either $150, $200, $250, $300, or $350),
resulting in one net outcomes value (i.e., either −$250, −$200,
−$150, −$100, −$50, or $100). Every 10 trials had 5 loss trials
with a total loss of $1250, thus resulting in an accumulated net
loss of $250. The four card decks were horizontally displayed
in the center of the screen. After the player chose a deck, two
separate payouts pertaining to self and to charity appeared. After
a total of 100 selections, the task automatically stopped without
warning; participants did not know how many trials the task
comprised. The total accumulated amount won for self and for
charity was shown on top of the screen on every trial. The specific
instructions we gave to the participants regarding the task were
described in the Supplementary Materials.
Reinforcement Learning Model
We applied a reinforcement learning model to characterize the
reward-learning process (Kwak et al., 2014). Decisions were
assumed to be made based on action values of each card deck,
calculated in response to the history of received rewards of both
types. Specifically, the value (Vij) of deck i on a given trial j is
defined as:
Vij = αQSij + (1− α)QCij (1)
where (QSij) and (QCij) are the estimated rewards to self and
charity, for deck i on trial j. The parameter α ranges between
completely self-interested (α = 1) and completely charity-
interested valuation (α = 0), as fit individually for each subject
based on choice patterns. QSij and QCij are updated each time the
particular deck is chosen.
FIGURE 1 | Payout structure for each card deck of the Social Gambling
Task (SGT). S = self, C = charity, + = gain deck, − = loss deck. For the gain
decks, each card draw always gave $50 but in some trials it was also
associated with losses ranging between $25 and $75 (i.e., loss of $25, $50, or
$75). Each card draw only displayed the outcome combining the gain and loss,
which ranged between −$25 to $50. Every 10 trials had 5 loss trials with a
total loss of $250, thus resulting in a net gain of $250. For the loss decks, each
card draw always gave $100 with some trials giving losses ranging between
$150 and $350 (i.e., loss of $150, $200, $250, $300, or $350). The outcome
displayed ranged between −$250 to $100. Every 10 trials had 5 loss trials
with a total loss of $1250, thus resulting in a net loss of $250. (A) An example
screen display of a trial in SGT (B). Figure adapted from Kwak et al. (2014).
QSij = QSi(j−1)+λS
(
RSj−QSi(j−1)
)
(2)
QCij = QCi(j−1)+λC
(
RCj−QCi(j−1)
)
(3)
RS and RC are the observed reward outcomes for self and
charity on the current trial j, λS, and λC are learning rates,
and (Rj–Qj−1) are the reward prediction errors for each reward
type.
Our model links option values (Vij) with choice probabilities
via the softmax rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
P
(
i|β,Vij
)
=
eβVij∑
j e
βVij
(4)
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Here, P is the probability of choosing a particular deck i on a
given trial j and β is a so-called “greediness” parameter with
β = ∞ corresponding to perfectly greedy (exploitive) choice
behavior.
Option values Vij are weighted sums of separately learned self
and charity values for each deck, with the proportion controlled
by a parameter α. We fit models using a maximum log likelihood
method implemented with MATLAB’s constrained optimization
routines (i.e., fmincon). For each subject, we fit β , α, and two
learning rates that captured responses to self and charity rewards
separately.
Data Analysis
SPSS Statistics 20.0.0 statistical software (SPSS Inc., Chicago,
IL) was used for all statistical analyses. The statistical threshold
for all analyses was a p value of 0.05. When computing
tests for repeated measures data, the Huynh–Feldt epsilon
(Huynh and Feldt, 1970) was used to determine whether
data met the assumption of sphericity (6 > 0.75). In
cases where the sphericity assumption was not met, the F
statistic was evaluated for significance using the Huynh–
Feldt adjusted degrees of freedom. The reinforcement learning
model was implemented using MATLAB (The Mathworks,
Natick, MA).
RESULTS
Social Gambling Task
Learning of the reward contingencies in the self and
charity domain was quantified as the Learning Index (LI):
the relative proportion of choices from gain decks versus
loss decks. Specifically, learning indices for self (LIself)
and for charity (LIcharity) were independently calculated as
follows:
LIself = (# of cards drawn from S+ /C+ and S+ /C−
decks)–(# of cards drawn from S− /C+ and S− /
C− decks) (5)
LIcharity = (# of cards drawn from S+ /C+ and S− /C+
decks)–(# of cards drawn from S+ /C− and S− /
C− decks). (6)
To determine how learning emerged across time for self and
charity in the children/adolescent and adults, we looked at
the changes in Learning Indices (LIself and LIcharity) across 10
blocks of 10 trials each. A repeated measures ANOVA with
domain (LIself vs. LIcharity) by block (block 1–10) as within-
subject factors and age group (children/adolescents vs. adults) as
a between-subject factor showed a significant main effect of block
[F(6.34, 1109.01) = 17.01, p < 0.0001] and an age-group-by-block
interaction [F(6.34, 1109.01) = 5.55, p < 0.0001] (Figure 2). Post
hoc testing revealed that the linear [F(1, 175) = 48.31, p < 0.0001]
and quadratic [F(1, 175) = 16.52, p < 0.0001] contrasts for
block were significant and the interaction with age group using
these two contrasts were also significant [linear: F(1, 175) = 11.75,
p = 0.001, quadratic: F(1, 175) = 5.81, p = 0.017]. These results
indicate that both the children/adolescents and adults learned the
reward contingencies over the task and that the two age groups
showed different rates in improvements over time, with adults
showing a steeper improvement over time. No other main effects
or interaction effects were found. No main effects or interaction
effects were found when using the total learning index across all
trials.
We also compared the choice strategies used by the two
age groups. Specifically we looked at how people adapted their
choice behavior following positive (i.e., win) or negative (i.e.,
lose) outcomes. We computed the proportion of choices that
were consistent with the following four different strategies: same
choice of card deck as the previous trial when the outcome of the
FIGURE 2 | Learning index across the 10 blocks (10 card draws each) for self and charity domain in children/adolescents and adults. The results from
adults were previously reported in Kwak et al. (2014). Learning index was independently calculated in the self and charity domain as the difference in the number of
gain decks and loss decks chosen.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1539
Kwak and Huettel Children’s Prosocial Reward Learning
previous trial was self win and charity win (WW), self win and
charity lose (WL), self lose and charity win (LW), and self lose,
and charity lose (LL).
We first examined whether subjects’ strategies predicted
overall learning by looking at the correlation between LI
difference (LIcharity–LIself) measure and each of the strategies. A
significant negative correlation (with Bonferroni correction for 4
different correlation analyses, p < 0.05/4) was found only with
WL strategy (r = −0.24, p = 0.001) suggesting that a greater use
of this strategy is associated with less prosocial and more selfish
reward learning across the entire task.
Next, we compared the use of the four strategies across age
groups using a repeated- measures ANOVA with age group as
a between-subject factor and strategy type as a within-subject
factor. We found a main effect of strategy type [F(3, 525) = 45.15,
p < 0.0001], age group [F(1, 175) = 47.10, p < 0.0001] and
an age-group-by-strategy-type interaction [F(3, 525)= 2.83, p =
0.038] (Figure 3). Children/adolescents were using all of these
strategies less frequently than adults. To interpret the interaction
effect, the repeated contrast was applied to the factor “strategy
type.” Significant interaction with age was found in WW vs. WL
[F(1, 175) = 6.58, p = 0.011] and WL vs. LW [F(1, 175) = 7.64,
p = 0.006] but not in LW vs. LL [F(1, 175) = 0.03, p = 0.854]
contrast. This implies that the age group difference in the use
of decision strategies is significantly greater in WL than the
other three strategies, with the reliance on this strategy being
particularly reduced in children/adolescents compared to adults.
To confirm whether the interaction effect was driven by the WL
strategy, we ran the same ANOVA model including only the
other three strategies. The age-by-strategy-type interaction was
no longer significant [F(2, 350) = 0.036, p = 0.97] indicating
that the previous age-by-strategy-type interaction was driven by
the WL strategy. These results suggest that compared to adults,
children and adolescents show decreased use of a strategy that
prioritizes rewards for self at the expense of rewards for others.
To determine how reward learning and strategy use change
across development, we looked at the correlation of those
measures with age within the children/adolescents sample alone.
We found a significant positive correlations (with Bonferroni
correction for six different correlations, p < 0.05/6) between
age and LIself (r = 0.41, p < 0.0001) and between age and
WW strategy (r = 0.37, p = 0.001) suggesting that learning
in self domain and the use of WW strategy increase with age
(Supplementary Figure 1). These results indicate that within this
age-range of pre-adolescence through adolescence (8–16 years),
there already exist important developmental changes in reward
learning and strategy use. No other relationships were significant.
In an effort to characterize the behavior of children and
adolescents at a population level as compared to adults, we
categorized individuals into subgroups based on the absence
or presence of evidence showing knowledge of the reward
contingencies of the card decks. Presence of knowledge was
evaluated according to whether a significantly greater number
of choices were made in the gain decks compared to the loss
decks throughout the entire experiment (knowledge present:
LI > 18, knowledge absent: LI ≤ 18, based on binomial
test at p < 0.05, one-tailed) (Bakos et al., 2010). This
categorization was done in both self and charity domain,
an approach that was taken in our previous study (Kwak
et al., 2014). This led to the following subgroups in both
the children/adolescents and the adults: individuals showing
knowledge in both the self and charity (Knowledge All group),
individuals showing knowledge only in self but not in charity
(Knowledge Self group), individuals showing knowledge only
in charity but not in self (Knowledge Charity group), and
a group who did not show evidence of knowledge for both
FIGURE 3 | The proportion of choices where the same deck was chosen from previous trial (i.e., proportion of stay choices) across four different
outcome scenarios of self and charity in children/adolescents and adults. WW refers to the case in which there were positive outcomes for both self and
charity, WL refers to a positive outcome for self and a negative outcome for charity, LW refers to a negative outcome for self and a positive outcome for charity and LL
refers to negative outcomes for both self and charity. Error bars indicate standard error.
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self and charity domain (No Knowledge group) (Table 1).
Although chi square test did not show significant difference in
the proportion of the four subgroups (χ2 = 6.92, p = 0.074) the
proportion of Knowledge Charity group was greater in children
and adolescents (14.7%) than in adults (10.7%) whereas the
proportion of Knowledge Self group was greater in adults (11.8%)
than in children/adolescents (6.7%).
We noticed that there was a greater proportion of No
Knowledge group in children and adolescents (53.3%) than
in adults (41.2%). In order to clarify whether the age group
differences are driven by differences in their ability to learn, we
conducted our analyses comparing learning indices and decision
strategies across age groups, after excluding the No Knowledge
group from both the children/adolescents and adults. The results
did not change significantly (see Supplementary Materials).
Reinforcement Learning Model
We first assessed whether the model predicted choices equally
well in children/adolescents and adults. On each trial, we
identified the deck with the highest probability of being chosen
as the model’s prediction (see Methods). In trials in which there
were two or three options tied in value, subject’s choice of one
of these tied values was considered correct. To be conservative,
trials with all four options tied were considered as incorrect trials.
The model correctly predicted a higher proportion of the choices
made by adults (0.49 ± 0.24) than by children and adolescents
(0.40 ± 0.18) [t(174.6) = 2.74, p = 0.007]. Based on our previous
study (Kwak et al., 2014), we excluded the No Knowledge
group from the reinforcement-learning analyses because those
individuals’ choice could not be successfully predicted by the
model.
We compared the self vs. charity bias (α) and the learning rates
for self and charity (λ) between the two age groups (Table 2).
Within our model, an α near 1 indicates that subjects chose
almost entirely based on rewards to themselves, while near 0
indicates that subjects focused solely on charitable outcomes.
Children and adolescents had a marginally lower α [t(94) = 1.88,
p = 0.064]. No significant differences were found in the learning
rates. We also explored whether the model parameters correlate
with age within the children/adolescents sample. We found a
significant positive relationship (with Bonferroni correction for
4 different correlations, p < 0.05/4) with percent accurately
predicted choices (r = 0.46, p = 0.005), suggesting that model
performance increases with age.
Other-Regarding Behavior
To determine how the two age groups differed in terms of their
overall other-regarding behavior assessed independently from
TABLE 1 | Number and proportion of participants in each subgroup.
Knowledge
all
Knowledge
self
Knowledge
charity
No
knowledge
Children/
Adolescents (%)
19 (25.3) 5 (6.7) 11 (14.7) 40 (53.3)
Adults (%) 40 (39.2) 12 (11.8) 8 (7.8) 42 (41.2)
SGT performance, the altruism and selfishness scores of the
Helping Orientation Questionnaire (HOQ) were compared in
the two groups. Mean altruism score was significantly higher
in children/adolescents (M ± SD: 11.95 ± 3.56) than in adults
(10.11 ± 3.72) [t(160) = −3.09, p = 0.002]. We also looked
at age group differences in their feelings toward the charity
foundation assessed by the additional questions we asked about
the charity foundation. While the degree to which they agreed
with the goal of the foundation did not differ across the two
age groups [t(175) = −0.34, p = 0.737], the degree to which
the goal/mission of the charity affected their choice behavior
was significantly higher in children/adolescents (3.49 ± 1.46)
than in adults (2.79 ± 1.36) [t(175) = −3.28, p = 0.001].
These results demonstrate that the chosen charity foundation
(i.e., “Make a Wish!” foundation) was equally appealing to both
age groups, although children/adolescents might have considered
the goal/mission of the foundation to a greater degree when
making their choices. When the happiness ratings to self and
charity reward outcomes were compared across age groups using
repeated measure ANOVA with domain (self vs. charity) as
a within subject factor and age group as a between subject
factor, we found a significant main effect of domain [F(1, 175)
= 19.64, p < 0.0001] and age group by domain interaction
[F(1, 175) = 47.95, p < 0.0001] (Figure 4). A paired t-test
showed that while adults felt happier when winning money for
themselves [t(101) = 2.03, p = 0.045], children and adolescents
felt happier when winning money for charity [t(74) = −6.97,
p < 0.0001].
We also examined correlation between age and thesemeasures
within the children/adolescents sample to look at age-related
changes in other regarding behavior. A significant relationship
(with Bonferroni correction for six different correlations, p <
0.05/6) was only found with the degree to which the goal/mission
of the charity affected their choice behavior in the positive
direction (r = 0.328, p = 0.004), suggesting that the degree
to which the goal/mission of the charity influenced decisions
increased with age.
DISCUSSION
We examined how reward learning unfolds in children and
adolescents when decisions have consequences for both oneself
and others. We used the previously developed social gambling
task (SGT, Kwak et al., 2014), which captures tradeoffs between
benefits to oneself and benefits to others under a dynamic
environment that involves uncertainty. In this task, preferences
for decks emerge over the course of the task unlike conventional
single-shot games; this provides information about implicit
learning of both non-social and social reward contingencies.
Our results from choices, decision strategies and the
reinforcement-learning model collectively show that children
and adolescents have greater sensitivity to rewards for others than
for self. This was most notably found in the use of particular
decision strategies. Specifically, the WL decision strategy—the
proportion of same choices with the previous trial when the
outcome was self win and charity lose—was used less often in
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TABLE 2 | Model parameters in the two age groups.
Model performance
(proportion correct)
Self/Charity reward sensitiviy (α = 1,
purely selfish; α = 0, purely charitable)
Learning rate self (λs) Learning rate charity (λc)
Adults (M ± SD) 0.63 ± 0.17 0.51 ± 0.34 0.29 ± 0.36 0.28 ± 0.37
Children/Adolescents (M ± SD) 0.53 ± 0.16 0.38 ± 0.34 0.39 ± 0.39 0.25 ± 0.34
For both adults and the children/adolescents, data from No Knowldege group was excluded from the reinforcement learning model analyses.
FIGURE 4 | Happiness rating for winning money for self vs. charity in children/adolescents and adults. Higher ratings indicate greater happiness reported
associated with winning money. Error bars indicate standard error.
children and adolescents as compared to adults. TheWL strategy
also negatively correlated with greater prosocial reward learning
(i.e., greater value of LIcharity–LIself). This implies that the
younger group is more influenced by the charity outcomes than
adults. Furthermore, the difference in reinforcement learning
model parameter α showed that children and adolescents weigh
charity reward relatively more than self reward compared to
adults when updating their choices on a trial by trial basis. The
results from SGT performance are also in line with the self-
report measures of other-regarding behavior as shown by higher
altruism score and relatively higher happiness ratings when
winning money for charity than self in children and adolescents
as compared to adults.
The use of a reinforcement learning model to explain the
reward learning process in the two age groups provides new
insight into the development of pro-social decision making.
Specifically the parameters of the reinforcement learning model
reveal trial-by-trial behavioral adjustments following the reward
outcomes for self and charity. Our results demonstrate that
children/adolescents differ from adults in how they incorporate
self and charity rewards across trials, a finding not necessarily
evident from the aggregate choices.
It is of note that the choice behavior in this task was more
variable in the younger group than adults, as reflected in several
results. First, children and adolescents did not show an equivalent
level of learning as the adults as shown by slower changes in LIs
across blocks. This suggests that they did not consistently choose
the decks associated with overall gain and switched their choices
more so than adults. This pattern is more apparent when looking
at the decision strategy measure, which gives the degree to which
the same card was selected across two consecutive trials. Children
and adolescents showed an overall reduction in the use of these
strategies suggesting that they switch between card decks more
than adults. Lastly, the fact that model performance was worse
in the younger group also suggests greater variability in choices.
Heightened behavioral variability in children as compared to
adults is a widely accepted finding that has been suggested to be
a central feature of cognitive development (Elliott, 1970; Siegler,
1994; Williams et al., 2005; Tamnes et al., 2012).
Several limitations of the current study provide directions for
future work. First, some participants (in both age groups) failed
to choose the positive reward decks consistently (i.e., the No
Knowledge groups). This may or may not reflect an absence of
successful learning. It remains possible, for example, that some
participants do correctly identify the “good” and “bad” decks but
do not consistently avoid the “bad” decks or seek the “good”
decks. This could occur because of a bias toward sampling new
decks, because of a lack of utility associated with a given deck
(e.g., not supporting the charity), or for some other reason.
Second, we used a wide age-range of children and adolescents
within our sample. Given the recognized developmental changes
in decision making from childhood to adolescence (Crone and
Dahl, 2012)—and the correlations with age we observed in the
present study—future research should narrow down the timing
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of developmental transitions within this large range. Third,
the pro-social behavior we observed in this study could have
been influenced by preferences specific to the chosen charitable
foundation (“Make a Wish!”). This charity was selected to be
appealing to both our younger and older participants, and indeed
our two age groups exhibited similar levels of agreement with its
goal and mission. However, we cannot completely rule out the
possibility that a different pattern of result could be observed with
a different social target.
Change in sensitivity to social contexts across development
is a widely studied topic (Nelson et al., 2005; Blakemore, 2010;
Burnett et al., 2011; Crone and Dahl, 2012). Development of
social cognitive skills including mentalizing and perspective
taking during adolescence allows increase in prosocial behaviors
as supported by self-report measures of altruism (Eisenberg
et al., 1995, 2002, 2005; Eiesnberg and Fabes, 1998; Killen
and Turiel, 1998; Carlo et al., 1999, 2007; Fabes et al., 1999;
Wentzel et al., 2007; Luengo Kanacri et al., 2013, 2014). These
characteristic developmental changes in mental representations
of choices, reward sensitivity and self-control abilities have been
invoked to explain greater sensitivity to rewards and increased
tendency to take risks (Casey, 2015; Reyna et al., 2015). Our
finding of heightened sensitivity to social rewards in children
and adolescents provides a clear, well-controlled test of how
the decision-making of pre-adolescents and adolescents changes
under a social environment in which others’ rewards are also
at stake. These results are also consistent with recent findings
showing greater risk taking in adolescents when surrounded by
peers (Albert et al., 2013).
SGT was modeled after the Iowa gambling task (IGT), which
has been repeatedly used in children and adolescent populations
(Lehto and Elorinne, 2003; Hooper et al., 2004; Crone and van
der Molen, 2007; Crone et al., 2008; Cauffman et al., 2010;
Smith et al., 2012); thus, the SGT may also become a viable
tool for this younger population. While some of these studies
showed age related increase in performance across adolescence
to adulthood (Hooper et al., 2004; Crone and van der Molen,
2007; Cauffman et al., 2010), there have also been reports of
mid-adolescence specific impairment showing a curvilinear trend
across development (Lehto and Elorinne, 2003; Smith et al.,
2012). Based on these previous reports, one might question
whether the age group differences in social reward learning
observed in SGT reflect age-related changes in general cognitive
abilities instead of changes in social preference. To address
this issue, we also ran all of our analysis after excluding
individuals in the No Knowledge subgroup in both adults and
children/adolescents (i.e., those who presented no evidence of
understanding of the task; see Supplementary Materials). This
allows us to limit our analysis within individuals demonstrating
the capability to sufficiently perform the task. Within this subset
of participants, we actually found a significant age group by
domain (i.e., self vs. charity) interaction inmean LI. This suggests
that age group differences in reward learning across the self and
charity domains is not necessarily a result of the difference in
general cognitive abilities between the age groups.
Another possible interpretation of our data is that children
and adolescents are trying to signal personal altruism—
a desirable trait in our society—instead of actually having
greater social preference. The possibility that the children
and adolescents give more socially desirable responses has
similarly been noted in prior research using self-report measures
(Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2002, 2005; Eiesnberg and Fabes,
1998; Killen and Turiel, 1998; Carlo et al., 1999, 2007; Fabes
et al., 1999; Wentzel et al., 2007; Luengo Kanacri et al.,
2013, 2014). However, our task paradigm provides a measure
of implicit sensitivity toward rewards for others. Specifically
the reinforcement learning parameter α describes trial-by-trial
adjustments in behavior based on their sensitivity to the reward
outcome for charity vs. self. This implicit measure of prosocial
tendencies would be more resistant to social desirability effects
than would traditional explicit measures (e.g., surveys).
The current study investigated how children and adolescents
process rewards directed to self and others by using the Social
Gambling Task (SGT), a paradigm that allows measuring the
dynamics of reward learning for oneself and for a socially
desirable target. Our results suggest that children and adolescents
have increased sensitivity to social outcomes that in turn
leads to procial behaviors such as donating to charity. These
results provide new insight into the contributions of social
information to decision making and have broader implications
for understanding the development of social decision making.
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